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Health outcomes for the Greek population
are favorable when compared to the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) country averages in terms of
life expectancy (79.6 years) and indicators such
as infant mortality. Access to healthcare is
theoretically universal, and inequalities by gen-
der are less pronounced than in other OECD
countries (OECD, 2009, pp. 86–87). Underneath
the outwardly stellar appearance, however, dis-
satisfaction among the vast majority of Greeks
suggests problems and inefficiencies. Only
about 18 percent of the Greek population is sat-
isfied with the healthcare system, which is sec-
ond lowest to Portugal in a 2002 EU-wide study
(OECD, 2009, p. 88). Furthermore, several pub-
lic health indicators, such as the nation’s high
childhood obesity rate and unusually high inci-
dence of smoking, are a cause for concern
(about 40 percent of the population). In Greece,
47 percent of all deaths are related to cardio-
vascular problems, which is higher than the
OECD average, and approximately 12 percent
of children are not vaccinated against measles,
diphtheria, tetanus, or whooping cough (DTP3)
(Economou and Giorno, 2009, p. 18).
While most health indicators of the Greek
population are still comparable to other OECD
countries, the indicators have not improved sig-
nificantly over the past decade, even though
healthcare spending has grown faster in Greece
than in most European Union countries. There-
fore, changes are necessary not only to improve
public health, but also to decrease healthcare
costs, especially as the baby boomer genera-
tion demands for services increase; people
over 65 already represent 20 percent of the pop-
ulation (Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU],
2011). Furthermore, healthcare spending is part
of a larger financial crisis that has led to several
bailouts and an international effort to help solve
Greece’s sovereign debt problems. A reduction
in government healthcare has become one of
the priorities for improving Greece’s financial
position. Healthcare takes up about 9.7 percent
of GDP annually, a figure that is above the 8.9
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percent OECD average and will increase to
about 10.4 percent by 20151 (EIU, 2011).
In response to such relatively high spend-
ing on healthcare, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has requested that Greece reduce
healthcare spending to 6 percent of GDP in
exchange for the €110 billion bailout (IMF, 
February 2011, p. 34; EIU, 2011). This goal
has been tackled over the past two years by
addressing, with a wide array of reforms, inef-
ficiencies of the Greek healthcare system.
Changes have been made to the system in
response to demands from the European com-
munity. Thus, this paper surveys structural
inefficiencies of Greece’s healthcare system,
examines solutions being implemented or pro-
posed, and identifies several of the inefficien-
cies that remain unaddressed.
Key Problems Being Resolved
In addressing these issues, it is impor-
tant to note that statistical information on the
Greek healthcare system is often incorrect,
biased, or simply nonexistent. Simple statis-
tics such as the breakdown of spending by inpa-
tient, outpatient, and pharmaceutical services
are difficult to obtain. Even the waiting lists
for services are shrouded in mystery. It is widely
recognized that no real progress in efficiency
can be made without making improvements
in the quantity and quality of statistical evidence
(OECD, 2009, p. 95).
This problem was addressed in 2010 with
the formation of an independent statistical
office, known as the Hellenic Statistical Author-
ity (ELSTAT) (IMF, July 2010, p. 14). ELSTAT
has a memorandum of understanding with
the many existing statistical agencies within the
branches of Greek government and compiles all
available data, for everything from the health-
care sector to trade, in a consolidated and sim-
ple form2 (IMF, December 2010, Second Review,
p. 83). Still, prominent gaps in data contribute
to difficulty in researching and assessing the
Greek healthcare system.
Problem # 1: Complicated
Institutional Structure
The Greek healthcare system is organ-
ized into three parts consisting of a large pri-
vate sector and two public sector branches. The
private sector makes up about 38 percent of
total healthcare expenditure and provides many
diagnostic facilities, labs, and outpatient clinics
(OECD, 2009, p. 87). About 8 percent of the pop-
ulation has private health insurance and is thus
able to receive timely and excellent care with
high satisfaction rates at private facilities (EIU,
2011). The remainder of the healthcare sys-
tem is the public system, divided into two parts,
each accounting for roughly 31 percent of
total healthcare. 
One part of this public system, introduced
in 1983, is the National Health System (NHS or
ESY, in Greek). The NHS is open to any per-
son in Greece, including illegal immigrants, and
provides access to basic healthcare. It is simi-
lar to the healthcare model used in Great
Britain, designed so that the government has
control of hospitals as well as primary care clin-
ics in rural areas (OECD, 2009, p. 93). There was
a ban on the building of private hospitals until
the 1990s aimed at increasing the importance
of the NHS in the provision of hospital services.
This ban contributed to the growth of a large
private sector, which instead invested in diag-
nostic imaging technology and strong outpa-
tient services and clinics. As a result of the
ban, the NHS currently funds 75 percent of all
hospital beds, whereas the private sector pro-
vides the remaining 25 percent (OECD, 2009,
pp. 102–103).
Coinciding with the NHS is the second
public system, in which workers are insured
through public sickness funds associated with
their professions. Membership in a fund is
mandatory, and although there are about 30
different funds, four main funds dominate
the system. These four are: IKA (for the private
sector and accounting for 50 percent of the
population), OGA (for the agricultural sector
and covering 20 percent of the population),
OAEE (for the self-employed and accounting
for 13 percent of the population), and OPAD
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1Following an expected slip in the 2011–12 year
due to the austerity measures.
2The previous statistical agency, the National Sta-
tistical Institute of Greece, was under the authority of the
Ministry of Economy and Finance; the current ELSTAT is
fully independent and responsible for integrating and
controlling the quality of statistics for all of the government
bodies, in line with the European Statistics Code of Prac-
tice (Georgiou and Snorrason, 2011, pp. 2–8).
(covers civil servants and accounts for 11
percent of the population) (OECD, 2009, p. 93).
The remaining population is covered by the
other 26 funds. The dominance of the four
main funds and the mandate to belong to the
fund associated with one’s profession reduces
choice and competition. Each insurance fund
has agreements with certain physicians and
facilities to provide services to its members,
thus limiting which doctors a patient may see.
Furthermore, the funds that have better serv-
ices with lower contribution rates are protected
by strong unions, making the merging of funds
difficult (EIU, 2011).
To add to the complexity of the three-tier
system, the two public branches of healthcare
are managed by an amalgam of government
ministries. The Ministry of Health and Social
Solidarity sets health policy and centrally allo-
cates resources and staff for all NHS hospitals.
The Ministry of Employment and Social Protec-
tion is in charge of the public sickness funds,
determining what medical benefits are cov-
ered and setting contribution rates for each
fund. The Ministry of Economy and Finance
determines patient co-pays and sickness fund
payment rates at NHS hospitals (even though
resources for the NHS are allocated by the afore-
mentioned Ministry of Health and Social Soli-
darity) and also covers any deficits of NHS
hospitals or deficits of the sickness funds. The
number of doctors is determined by the Ministry
of Education, based on available spots in med-
ical schools, and the Ministry of Development
controls drug prices (OECD, 2009, p. 95).
This three-part system, managed by sev-
eral agencies, has been inefficient. According to
a study using data envelopment analysis (DEA),
a method that connects health outcomes to
expenditure on healthcare as a measure of
efficiency, Greece’s rankings fell between 1990
and 2006. When efficiency is measured in terms
of healthcare spending per capita, Greece’s rank
fell nine spots from third to twelfth among
OECD countries. Measured by number of
healthcare personnel, Greece’s rank fell 13 spots
from fifth to eighteenth among OECD coun-
tries. The relatively larger 13-spot drop between
1990 and 2006, seen with respect to the num-
ber of healthcare personnel, suggests that effi-
ciency is related to changes in technical and pro-
cedural efficiency, including the higher
administrative costs of dealing with multiple
agencies, rather than altered spending pat-
terns (OECD, 2009, p. 90). This observation fur-
ther suggests that, while spending is impor-
tant because of the financial hardships facing
Greece, the sources and cures for inefficien-
cies in the healthcare system reach beyond
spending.
Changes within the Institutional
Structure: Consolidation
With the mandates from the IMF to reduce
healthcare spending to 6 percent of GDP, sev-
eral inadequacies related to the institutional
framework have been addressed in the past year
(IMF, December 2010, Letter of Intent, p. 35).
Health insurance funds were made separate
from pension funds, making healthcare a fully
distinct entity (IMF, September 2010, p. 10).
Further changes have been made to stream-
line the NHS hospital system and the insurance
funds.
To improve the organization of the NHS
hospital system, a system of joint manage-
ment has been established in which small and
large hospitals in geographic proximity coor-
dinate with each other in providing patient care.
Small hospitals now specialize in certain types
of treatment (such as cancer care or rehabili-
tation) whereas larger hospitals remain respon-
sible for a wider array of functions. This con-
figuration has lowered the number of hospital
administration boards and has replaced some
previously unqualified, politically appointed hos-
pital managers with professionals qualified in
health administration. By 2012, such greater
organizational oversight is expected to culmi-
nate in reports that will compare hospitals
across Greece in terms of services provided
and is expected to reduce costs in NHS hospi-
tals by 10 percent in 2011 and another 5 percent
in 2012 (IMF, July 2011, Letter of Intent, 
pp. 55–56). 
In order to improve the social insurance
funds, the four big health insurance funds
have been merged into a single fund called
the National Organization for Healthcare Pro-
vision (the EOPYY), which now has improved
ability to bargain for the provision of service
contracts with healthcare providers. Previously,
all social insurance funds had contracts with
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specific groups of physicians, and patients of dif-
ferent insurance funds would often pay bribes
to doctors who were not authorized to see them
(EIU, 2011). Now the EOPYY will provide one
health package to all EOPYY members, which
should reduce the disparities in both the serv-
ice and contribution rates that existed among
different social insurance funds (IMF, Novem-
ber 2011, pp. 50–51). While the EOPYY has
reduced disparities in service, contribution rates
are still in the process of being equalized (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011, p. 34).
Yet another step that remains to be taken
is the consolidation of healthcare regulation to
one government ministry (OECD, 2011, p. 101). 
While this is a seemingly obvious strategy,
consolidating the work of five agencies into one
is no easy feat and would undoubtedly increase
short-term instability among already-angered
public sector workers. It would nonetheless be
wise to reduce excess spending incurred by cur-
rent bureaucratic inefficiency.
Problem # 2: Funding the Healthcare
System
The sources of funding for Greece’s
healthcare system are likewise problematic.
Of the 9.7 percent of GDP devoted to health-
care, only about 60.3 percent is public spend-
ing, which is low compared to the 72.8 per-
cent OECD average (EIU, 2011). This public
spending, dedicated to the NHS and sickness
funds, is financed by 52 percent from general
taxation and 48 percent from social security
contributions (OECD, 2009, p. 93). The reliance
on taxation is problematic because of the tax
evasion problem in Greece. Also, because about
a quarter of all jobs in Greece are undocu-
mented, using social security contributions
(which are drawn from paychecks) as a way to
fund the system means that 25 percent of the
working public is not contributing.
The remaining 38 percent of total health-
care spending, accounting for about 3.5 percent
of GDP, comes from private citizens paid
directly out of pocket (OECD, 2009, p. 87). This
high level private spending contributes to dis-
satisfaction with the healthcare system. An
additional form of private spending is the infor-
mal payment system, which is difficult to quan-
tify and consists of bribes that patients pay in
order to get good and timely service. Some
studies estimate that informal payments make
up about 17 percent of total healthcare spend-
ing. The average amount needed to bribe
healthcare professionals during a hospital
stay is estimated at €300 (OECD, 2009, p. 105).
This payment does not contribute to funding
the healthcare system but instead supplements
the salaries of healthcare professionals. These
salaries are lower than in most OECD coun-
tries, ranging from 1,233 to 2,466 USD per
month adjusted for purchasing power (PPP),
while the average Greek monthly salary is 2,569
USD PPP (Reginato and Grosso, 2011). Even
the highest official salaries of Greek physicians
are lower than the average salary in Greece
(adjusted for purchasing power), which explains
the prevalence of informal payments.
The burden of private spending is one rea-
son why dissatisfaction with the system is so
high. This dissatisfaction is exacerbated by the
fact that households privately finance 50 per-
cent of their primary care expenditures, with
primary care typically accessed more frequently,
compared to the private financing of 30 percent
of hospital and pharmaceutical costs (OECD,
2009, p. 102).
Improving the Sources of Funding
Reducing tax evasion has been one of the
current government’s main priorities and is rel-
evant to funding the healthcare system. One
new way tax evasion has been targeted is by
crosschecking tax information with spending
habits. Helicopters are actually flown over physi-
cians’ homes to identify those who have back-
yard swimming pools yet claim low incomes on
their tax reports. Recently, hotlines have been
set up to promote the reporting of tax evaders,
and the government has publicly shamed 68
high-profile doctors who were found guilty
(Malone, 2011). More drastic measures, such as
revoking the medical licenses of tax-evading
physicians, have not been employed to date.
Another idea has been the “Take Your
Receipt” movement, where the public is urged
to request receipts for services rendered to
ensure that transactions are documented and
taxed. Asking for receipts is thought also to
reduce the level of informal payments. Imple-
menting this movement has been a problem,
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however, because doctors often reduce their fees
if patients are willing to forego receipts. Simply
increasing the salaries of physicians to pre-
vent taking bribes has been ineffective in the
past; a 250 percent increase in NHS hospital
physicians’ salaries in the 1980s had little effect
(OECD, 2009, p. 106). Other general anti-tax
evasion strategies to increase the size of the for-
mal economy have important implications for
the healthcare system but are beyond the scope
of this paper. 
Problem # 3: Problems within the
NHS public hospitals
The revenue from taxes and social security
is pooled and distributed to NHS facilities and
sickness funds, based on previous years’ distri-
butions. Little effort is made to determine which
NHS facilities should get more or less fund-
ing, partially because there is little statistical
data to guide allocations and also because
well-funded facilities have political clout. This
inequity causes many NHS facilities, particu-
larly in the rural areas, to be underfunded and
thus understaffed. Attempts to de-centralize the
allocation of resources to NHS facilities have
been unsuccessful; for example, the formation
of administrative healthcare regions (called
DYPEs) to gather data on resource allocation
from various geographical regions increased
bureaucracy without improving the efficiency
of resource allocation (OECD, 2009, p. 100).
Compounding the effect of being under-
funded, hospitals themselves are inefficient.
Hospital accounting procedures were deficient
until a double-entry bookkeeping system was
introduced in 2010. Prior to that, hospitals were
run on a cash basis. Managers at NHS hospi-
tals were appointed based not on managerial
capability, but on political connection. Today,
Greek hospitals still largely lack modern IT sys-
tems and thus have difficulty maintaining
proper accounting procedures and managing
other important information.
Despite problems of underfunding and
inefficiency in hospitals, there is significant
over-utilization of public hospital services. Sick-
ness funds reimburse hospitals for only 20 to 30
percent of the market price of public hospital
services and about 10 percent of the market
price of primary care screening procedures such
as pap smears; the remainder is funded by the
state budget (65 percent) and out-of-pocket
expenses of the patients (5–15 percent). The
funds’ low reimbursement rates for hospital and
other services leads to overuse and puts undue
pressure on public hospitals while lowering
demand for private hospitals, where the sickness
funds pay the full market price (OECD, 2009, 
p. 101). This discrepancy is yet another reason
why public hospitals provide the previously
mentioned 75 percent of all hospitals beds while
private hospitals provide only 25 percent.
People who rely solely on the NHS use
hospitals for primary care, so NHS emergency
rooms treat conditions that should be addressed
by primary care physicians on an outpatient
basis. Also, NHS hospitals do not receive pay-
ment from the various social insurance funds
immediately, leading to increases in hospital
debt over time as payments are not properly
tracked. Certain insurance funds with lower
contribution rates pay benefits that are not in
line with the contributions received, creating
another cash flow imbalance. Furthermore,
because of the emphasis on hospitals, which are
preferred by sickness funds and are the main
recipients of NHS funding, inadequate resources
are allocated for prevention (OECD, 2009, p. 99).
This distortion is visible in the previously
mentioned poor public health indicators such
as immunization rates, obesity, and smoking. 
Improving Allocation of Resources
to and within NHS Hospitals
Most recent IMF-encouraged reforms aim
at making the NHS hospitals themselves more
efficient. The newly established statistical body,
ELSTAT, compiles data on Greek hospitals in
order to guide more efficient allocation of
resources—not by precedent, but by current
need. Also, in addition to double-entry book-
keeping, accounting firms are being placed into
hospitals to oversee spending and accounts
payable. A new common registry for medical
supplies is being implemented so that the use
of supplies can be better monitored. E-prescrib-
ing—for everything from drugs to referrals
for diagnostic as well as surgical procedures—
is soon to be implemented as well. Also, an elec-
tronic medical record system is being estab-
lished to prevent duplication of services or
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overutilization of care. The ultimate goal is
the complete computerization of hospitals, from
budgeting to the provision of services. Hospitals
are required to stay open all day to increase rev-
enue, rather than only half-days as they were in
the past. To reduce demand, co-payments for
hospital visits will be enforced at three euro;
additional co-payments are being placed on out-
patient, diagnostic services, and unwarranted
emergency room visits. A new website (esy.net)
will provide information about hospitals and
their services (IMF, Aug 2010, p. 5; Feb 2011,
p. 35).
Despite these changes, measures remain
to be taken to de-incentivize preference for hos-
pitals by the social insurance funds (in that they
have to pay for only about 20 percent of the cost
of hospital services that their patients use),
instead making primary care procedures more
highly subsidized while increasing the pay-
ments social insurance funds make to hospi-
tal stays. Further de-centralization of decision-
making (perhaps by using DYPEs as they were
originally intended) will help make the NHS
more equitable.
Problem # 4: Matching the Goals of
Medical Professionals to the Needs of
the Healthcare System
The Greek healthcare system is saturated
with specialized physicians but desperately lack-
ing primary care physicians. This imbalance is
particularly unfortunate because countries with
more primary care physicians generally have
better population-wide health. About 9.5 per-
cent of doctors in Greece are primary care physi-
cians (including internists), whereas the OECD
average was about 35 percent in 2006. Fur-
thermore, only about five percent of Greek doc-
tors work in the countryside, which accounts
for 25 percent of the population. This geograph-
ical imbalance is especially problematic for
the overburdened NHS hospitals in rural areas,
which are obligated to treat many illegal immi-
grants who enter Greece through the islands.
Statistics indicate that Greece has the same
number of physicians as France, despite hav-
ing one-sixth of the population. Indeed, Greece
has the highest number of physicians per
100,000 inhabitants of all OECD countries. So
the issue lies in poor distribution of doctors
across specialties and across geographical
regions, and this disproportion creates the prob-
lem of inadequate access to care and drives up
costs (OECD, 2009, pp. 96–97).
The undersupply of nurses in Greece is
another problem. The OECD estimates the
shortage to be about 15,000 nurses, which is 40
percent of the current nurse workforce. Even if
these positions were filled, the density of nurses
would still be approximately 4.7 percent, much
below the OECD average of 9.5 percent (OECD,
2009, p. 96). This shortage is attributed to the
unattractive wage paid to nurses, which is about
half the official wage of physicians. Yet, due
to the shortage, many doctors perform nurses’
duties while still being paid higher salaries. This
is one reason why the nursing deficit causes
unnecessary spending on healthcare.
Apart from the substantial shortage of pri-
mary care physicians and nurses, the existing
doctors, whether they are specialists or primary
care physicians, do not have sufficient incen-
tives to improve the public health. Doctors are
typically employed by either sickness funds to
treat outpatients or by the NHS in hospitals.
Their salaries are relatively low, as previously
described, and do not differ by geographical area
(urban vs. rural) or by the numbers of patients
that they see. Doctors are also permitted to
set up their own private clinics (i.e. “moonlight-
ing”) while practicing in the public sector, and
many do so to boost their incomes. This prac-
tice moves patients from the public healthcare
system to private clinics and is inequitable
because, although services should be free
according to policy, consultations at private clin-
ics are expensive and exclude poorer people
from quality treatment (OECD, 2009, p. 104).
However, dual practice has not been prohib-
ited because policymakers recognize that doc-
tors may choose to supplement their incomes
with higher bribes. Thus, a ban on dual practice
would do nothing to decrease costs and would
likely make the system even more unfair. 
Incentivizing Change among the
Medical Professionals
The consolidation of the major health
funds into the EOPYY is predicted to reduce the
number of doctors who are employed by social
insurance funds by 25 percent (IMF, November
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2011, pp. 50–51). Even with this excess of newly
unemployed doctors, the shortage of primary
care physicians will continue. Some analysts
believe that, since the Ministry of Education
implements medical education, it may be solely
focused on the financial resources at its disposal
and may thus be responsible for distortions
across medical specialties and for the lack 
of primary care physicians (OECD, 2009, 
p. 95). 
A 2007 study questioned such assumptions
and surveyed about 1,100 soon-to-graduate
medical school students about their choice of
specialty. Only 4.3 percent of the students sur-
veyed were interested in general or family prac-
tice, the most common reasoning of the other
95.7 percent being the reportedly more rigor-
ous, scientific, and higher prestige specialties
such as surgery. General and family practice was
established as a specialty in the 1980s, and
attempts to raise its prestige, such as immedi-
ate tenure for general physicians hired at Health
Centers, have been unsuccessful. Other incen-
tives are needed, and medical education should
be reoriented to convey the importance of pri-
mary care (Mariolis et. al., 2007).
Several proposals have addressed the prob-
lem of poor incentives for doctors to work
efficiently within the healthcare system. Since
bribes are essentially informal fees-for-service,
it has been suggested that an official fee-for-
service mandate would reduce bribery and
increase healthcare system revenue. This man-
date would tie doctors’ salaries to the number
of patients they see, incentivizing care for many
patients in a timely fashion. To maintain fair-
ness, a coverage limit (referred to as the capi-
tation system), where the government gives a
set amount for each patient’s treatment, has
been proposed. The simultaneous implemen-
tation of a fee-for-service and capitation system,
and retaining out-of-pocket co-payments to
limit the demand from consumers, would
reduce both bribes and overuse of medical serv-
ices, and would also provide an incentive for
doctors to see more patients (OECD, 2009, 
pp. 106–107; 2011, p. 101). 
Another suggestion for reducing the inef-
ficiency is the use of a gatekeeping system,
where general practitioners screen patients
before they see specialists. This approach, while
used in many countries with efficient healthcare
systems, would not be immediately feasible in
Greece because there are so few primary care
physicians to serve as gatekeepers. Salary differ-
entials by specialty (to promote general prac-
tice) and geographical region have been pro-
posed but not implemented because of the
economic crisis (OECD, 2009, p. 107). Further-
more, it is unclear whether medical students
would choose primary care as a specialty solely
for the higher salaries, given that a previously
mentioned study has shown that their choices
are based on status and not swayed by the prom-
ise of tenure at a Health Center. However, this
conclusion is based on just one study, and finan-
cial incentives should therefore be given further
consideration. Such a gatekeeping system may
also restrict choice for Greeks, and it would
necessitate higher salaries as incentive for
general practitioners to move to rural areas.
However, such a gatekeeping system, if success-
ful, could reduce costs and inefficiencies in
the healthcare system.
Problem # 5: Pharmaceuticals and
Diagnostic Services
Pharmaceutical spending takes up nearly
2.5 percent of Greece’s GDP, which is higher
than any other OECD country and another
source of excessive waste in the healthcare
system (OECD, 2011, p. 100). This expendi-
ture has been the primary target for cost reduc-
tion in the effort to lower total healthcare spend-
ing to 6 percent of GDP. According to interviews
with officials at the National School of Public
Health in Greece, past expenditure on phar-
maceuticals has been unnecessarily high due to
contracts between pharmaceutical companies
and unaccountable policymakers. This over-
spending on pharmaceuticals is caused in part
by underutilization of generic drugs, which
account for only about 35 percent of the Greek
drug market (whereas the U.S. has a generic
drug penetration rate of about 90 percent)
(McKinsey & Company, 2012, pp. 61–62). Cur-
rently, the Greek government is tackling phar-
maceutical spending with a set of measures
aimed at lowering the cost of pharmaceuticals
by mandating that hospitals prescribe generic
drugs whenever possible, with the goal of mov-
ing to the generic market penetration rate of
other European Union countries such as Germany
61
(62 percent) and the UK (60 percent) (IMF,
August 2010, p. 40; IMAP, 2011, Appendix D).
Furthermore, drug procurement by hospitals
must now take place by active ingredient, not
by brand name; additionally, generic drug prices
have been capped at 60 percent of the corre-
sponding brand name prices. Lastly, the govern-
ment has published a new positive list of cov-
ered medications, replacing the old negative list
of the few medications that are not covered
(European Commission, 2011, pp. 59–60). 
Spending on pharmaceuticals is higher
than it should be as indicated by Greece’s cli-
mate and disease burden. Typically, drugs are a
cheaper alternative to surgery and other treat-
ments, but overuse and cost in Greece are so
high that this is not the case. Currently, the
Greek government is working on a set of pre-
scription guidelines for physicians as well as a
means of prescribing medication electronically
(e-prescribing). This technological change
would allow the government to track pre-
scriptions and even provide all physicians
with individual biannual reports on how much
they have prescribed. The Greek government
has additionally made a priority of monitor-
ing misconduct and conflict of interest of
doctors who may be overprescribing certain
medications (IMF, July 2011, p. 6; Fourth
Review, p. 131).
A further issue in the pharmaceutical
industry prior to 2011 was the closed nature
of the pharmacist profession, which imposed
tight restrictions on entrance into the profes-
sion and allowed pharmacists to make a 35
percent profit, driving up costs (Daley, 2010).
Deregulation of the industry in January 2011
was controversial, reducing the profits to a small
flat fee plus a margin of 15 percent. The changes
also included more flexible hours for pharma-
cies and reduced minimum population crite-
ria for opening new pharmacies (IMF, Febru-
ary 2011, pp. 38, 55).
Another cause of inefficiency is the over-
use of diagnostic services; a professor at the
National School of Public Health revealed that
about 3.5 million CT scans are performed on a
yearly basis for a population of 10 million (Mani-
adakis, N.). Similar to the over-prescription of
pharmaceuticals, overuse of diagnostic imaging
can be curtailed by e-prescribing and improved
oversight. Because many diagnostic facilities are
privately owned, cost control on diagnostic pro-
cedures is difficult; therefore, reductions in
diagnostic testing must come from physicians
through diagnostic imaging guidelines. How-
ever, no known measures have been imple-
mented as of May 2012.
Progress in the Pharmaceutical Goals
By the end of 2011, the goal was to have
a generic drug penetration rate of 50 percent
(IMF, December 2010, Letter of Intent, p. 47).
This target was not met, however, because
although prescription guidelines and a posi-
tive drug list have been published, the e-pre-
scription system has not yet been fully launched.
Thus, it has been impossible to enforce prescrip-
tion guidelines or to move forward without
the advantages of the e-prescribing system
(European Commission, 2011, pp. 59–60). In
terms of drug procurement, Greece is moving
toward a more central method of drug procure-
ment with the support of a uniform coding
system and the e-prescription system to help
define demand (European Commission, 2011,
p. 63). Consequently, it remains to be seen
how and when a comprehensive e-prescribing
system may produce changes in the way phar-
maceuticals are prescribed and procured. 
Conclusion
While the Greek healthcare system is in
transition at present, and many changes are
being legislated and implemented, several rec-
ommendations are needed for further improve-
ment. While it may be tempting to cut costs
in every aspect of healthcare, I recommend a
series of transformations that are sustainable
and avoid severe counterproductive cutbacks. 
Major improvements to the institutional
structure can be made by consolidating health-
care administration from five ministries to just
one, which would lower costs and reduce
bureaucratic inefficiency. Healthcare funding
can be improved first by reducing tax evasion
on all levels. Furthermore, funds should be
diverted from the informal to the formal pay-
ment system, possibly by launching a campaign
that would curtail bribes. To reduce pressure
on NHS hospitals, the contribution rates of
social insurance funds should be altered to
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de-incentivize preference for hospitals in favor
of primary care facilities. To address the human
capital problem, the profile of primary care
practice must be raised in medical schools, and
the nursing profession must be more lucra-
tive and respected. When medical schools grad-
uate more primary care physicians, a gate-
keeper system should be established to limit
specialized services. To give physicians more
incentive to work efficiently, a dual fee-for-serv-
ice and capitation system should be established,
while maintaining co-payments to decrease
demand from the public. Lastly, to address
the overuse of pharmaceuticals and diagnos-
tic tools and to promote centralized drug 
procurement, e-prescribing should be imple-
mented to improve the monitoring of prescrip-
tions. Without e-prescribing, crucial reforms in
healthcare spending on hospitals, pharma-
ceuticals, and diagnostics are difficult to imple-
ment and track. 
These suggestions are meant to supple-
ment efforts that policy makers in Greece
have already initiated to reform the health-
care system. Indeed, even if such changes are
implemented, other issues will likely emerge.
Similar to those in other countries, the health-
care system of Greece is continuously in flux.
Constant changes and alteration to health-
care will be necessary in the future to keep up
with the changing needs of Greece’s economy
and society.
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